张化桥: 过去30年，如果你没有灰色收入，并且每个月坚持储蓄15％的税后收入，那么，今天你也许可以买个小房子。 还是投机，和当官来的快。 咱们如何教育下一代坚持储蓄？ Thirty years ago this month, I was a graduate student at thePeople's Bank of China in Beijing. The average monthly wage on themainland was about 40 yuan at that time. I was lucky to be paid 52yuan. But my money would always run out before the next pay chequearrived. Fei Yun, my mentor then, was 10 years my senior and in my sameclass. He taught me how to save at least 15 yuan each month. Embarrassed and grateful, I have since taken Fei's teachings toheart. However, older and arguably wiser, I have recently turneddown several invitations to advise young entrants into the labourforce about ways to manage their personal finances and build nesteggs - mainly because I have nothing useful to say. Saving for a rainy day is a big part of Chinese culture, butthat culture, as well as the country's social fabric, is underattack from all quarters, including assaults resulting from thecountry's misguided monetary policies of the past threedecades. An ordinary civil servant or a factory worker on the mainlandmight have faithfully saved a fifth of his honest income each yearfor 30 years. But if he had not borrowed heavily to buy anapartment some years ago, he can forget that idea altogether thesedays as real estate prices have shot up beyond his wildestdreams. In the meantime, the purchasing power of his savings hasevaporated as consumer price inflation of 5 to 10 per cent a yearhas consistently run faster than the interest rates of bankdeposits, which currently stand at around 1 to 3 per cent. Rentalsand housing prices have risen still faster, but they are not in theofficial statistics on inflation. In the late 1980s and early '90s, when inflation got out ofcontrol, the mainland introduced an "inflation subsidy" tocompensate savers. But the subsidy, which amounted to as much as 10percentage points on top of base rates on deposits, contributed tothe crippling of the banks and that led to a wholesalerecapitalisation of the banking sector from 2000 to 2002. The official reasoning for the tight regulation of interestrates (particularly on deposit rates) is typical among poorcountries. First, the government argues that the mainland needs lowinterest rates to grow its economy and create jobs. Second, almostall banks are state-owned and cannot be trusted to set sensiblerates on deposits. They may, the argument goes, compete for fundson interest rates, causing a banking crisis. While the official statistics on inflation are widelydiscredited, savers instinctively know the true extent ofinflation, and have fought back. They have speculated on realestate and the stock market, and directly lent to businesses andconsumers. The banks have also piled in to undermine the interest rateregulations by offering wealth management products at much higherinterest rates, bypassing official controls over interest rates,lending quotas and loan-to-deposit ratios. The banks haveeffectively brought shadow banking under their own roofs. When deposit rates are kept at artificially low levels, a primelending rate of 6 per cent is also below a market-clearing level.As a result, demand for loans is artificially boosted, and lendingdecisions are often based on political and personal reasons. The consequences of financial repression in the past threedecades are evident. Today, the mainland suffers massive industrialovercapacity, real estate overbuild, environmental catastrophe andworsening socioeconomic inequality. The biggest beneficiaries of the interest rate controls arethose who have had access to heavily-subsidised bank loans, thanksto asset price inflation. The hardest-hit have been pensioners,farmers and ordinary salary-earners who did not have the courage,or the means, to borrow and speculate. Asset price inflation has transformed many city suburbs intofactories, shopping malls, or residential high-rises. The dramaticchange has made many villagers suddenly wealthy, but they do notknow what to do with the wealth. On the one hand, they engage inspeculation, gambling, and ostentatious consumption, burningthrough newly minted millions. On the other hand, they are too richand too unskilled to be employed in any industry or service sector,despite having just lost their farms. At a recent investment seminar in Beijing, I asked the audiencewhat their "Chinese dreams" were. The first respondent replied: "Iwant to become the secretary of the Communist Party in my city."That got a big laugh from his fellow investors. Against growing evidence on who gets ahead and how, I am not theonly parent to find it hard to preach the virtues of saving tochildren. And I am often met with rebuttals from our own children.Should we start to teach them to bet their last yuan on real estateor the stock market and have them become corrupt politicians? Joe Zhang, the author ofInside China's Shadow Banking:The Next Subprime Crisis?, is chairman of Wansui Micro Creditin Guangzhou |
Powered by Discuz! X5.0
© 2001-2026 Discuz! Team.
